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The story of the Sevso Treasure is the latest saga involving
plundered antiquities' and other works of arte to find its way
into the courtrooms of the United States, where many of the
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I I treat the Treasure as falling within the category of plundered
antiquities due to its age and its provenance, which is sketchy at best. See
Republic of Leb. v. Sotheby's, 561 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (1990) (noting that the
Treasure remained undiscovered for approximately 1,400 years, as well as
the "absence of any confirmed 'find place'"). The New York Supreme Court's
November 1993 decision in favor of the Marquess of Northampton resolved
that the Treasure, a collection of silver objects, was not illegally excavated
and exported from either Hungary or Croatia. See Patrick Boylan, Treasure
Trove with Strings Attached; As Long as its Origin is Unclear, the Sevso
Silver Hoard is of Dubious Value, Says Patrick Boylan, THE INDEPENDENT,
Nov. 9, 1993, at 18. The New York State Court of Appeals recently refused
to hear an appeal of the trial court's decision by Hungary and Croatia. See
Two Nations Lose Claim to Old Silver, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at C18.
These decisions did not, however, put to rest the troubling issue of the
Lebanese export certificates, which were denounced by the Republic of
Lebanon as fake. See Boylan, supra, at 18. It was the problematic export
license that caused the Getty Museum to refuse to consider purchasing the
silver when it was offered to that institution in a private sale several years
ago. See Sarah Jane Checkland & Andrew Pierce, Sevso Silver. Peer's Win
Leaves Rivals Smarting, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 5, 1993, at 6; David
D'Arcy, British Lord Retains Ownership of Silver Antiquities, (National
Public Radio, morning edition, Nov. 11, 1993) (transcript # 1214-16),
available in LEXIS, News Library, NPR File.
' This Comment will use the phrase "work of art" in its most general
sense to refer to paintings, sculpture, manuscripts, and objects of any kind
that have a value other than purely utilitarian and that are marketable. By
contrast, the terms "cultural property" and "cultural objects" will be used in
a more limited sense to refer to works of art that are considered part of a
nation's cultural heritage, history, and/or ethnicity.
' See Jeremy Sugerman, Note, A New Cultural Property Repose Act, 22
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 671, 685 (1989) (describing the litany of
cases on this subject).
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title disputes that plague the art world are resolved.' At the
center of this particular tale,' which has been compared by
one commentator to The Maltese Falcon,' lies a magnificent
silver platter more than two feet in diameter7 depicting
hunting and banquet scenes' and bearing the Latin
inscription, "Let these, 0 Sevso, yours for many ages be, small
vessels fit to serve your offspring worthily."' After much
publicity'0 and a trial filled with unusual testimony,
including that of a "gypsy trader from a Budapest market who
claimed she kept her nail polish in one of the bowls," i x the
collection of fourteen silver objects, which has an estimated
value of $100 million,'2 has been deemed by the Supreme
" See Stephen K. Urice, Remarks on Current Cases and Controversies
Concerning International Repatriation or Return for ALI-ABA Course of
Study on the Legal Problems of Museum Administration 5 (Mar. 20, 1991)
(on file with author) (noting the large number of repatriation cases filed by
source nations in U.S. courts despite the high costs of litigation).
r See Hugh Davies, Marquess Wins Battle Over £50m Treasure, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 5, 1993, at 1 (describing the outcome of and circumstances
surrounding the litigation).
6 See D'Arcy, supra note 1.
7 See Davies, supra note 5, at 1.
8 See id.
' I It is based on this inscription that the collection of 14 silver objects
has been dubbed the "Sevso Treasure." Carol Vogel, InsideArt, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1993, at C5. Sevso is believed to have been a military commander
in the Roman army. See Davies, supra note 5, at 1.
l0 A search conducted September 27, 1993 on LEXIS using the World
Library and the Allwld File generated 57 stories on the Sevso Treasure.
Understandably, many more articles appeared following the New York
Supreme Court's decision in early November 1993.
" Checkland & Pierce, supra note 1, at 6. This specific testimony was
offered by Hungary, which, along with Croatia, remained a claimant to the
silver at the time of the trial. When the silver was transported to New York
by Sotheby's in order to generate interest for the sale of the collection at
auction, the Republic of Lebanon filed suit in New York court, claiming that
the objects had been illegally excavated and exported from that nation.
"[D]ue to the prohibitive costs of litigation," however, Lebanon withdrew
from the suit on the first day of trial. Id. It is, of course, possible that
Lebanon merely had been holding out in the hopes of settling on the eve of
trial. The withdrawal of Lebanon left Hungary and Croatia to battle with
Lord Northampton, who has spent approximately two million dollars
defending his rights thus far. Id. Sotheby's also was one of the original
defendants until the case against it was dismissed. Id. See also Vogel,
supra note 9, at C5.
1 Sotheby's pre-sale (the original sale was scheduled for the fall of 1990)
estimate for the Treasure was $70 million. See Republic of Leb., 561
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Court of New York to belong to the Seventh Marquess of
Northampton.'
1. INTRODUCTION
The case of the Sevso Treasure exemplifies many of the
issues presented by the illicit international trade in art. 4
This illicit trade can be divided roughly into two distinct types
of illegality. One involves the outright theft of works of art
from their owners (whether they be private individuals,
museums, galleries, or the State itself) and the subsequent
transport of these stolen works across borders to countries in
which the pieces are easily marketable (like the United States
or England, 5 where many of the world's major auction
N.Y.S.2d at 567. Currently, however, the Treasure's value has been
estimated at nearly $100 million. See Davies, supra note 5, at 1 (250
million); D'Arcy, supra note 1 ($100 million).
1" At least one commentator knowledgeable about the art market has
voiced the opinion that this litigation actually has resolved very little
concerning the true ownership of the Sevso Treasure. Boylan, supra note
1, at 18. Boylan, who is Vice-President of the International Council of
Museums ("ICOM") and chaired the committee which drafted ICOM's
International Code of Professional Ethics, makes the point that despite the
fact that the Sevso Treasure is of "museum quality" and theoretically is
worth up to $100 million, it is uncertain whether any institution can afford
to assume the potential legal nightmare that comes with the collection. I&
As he notes, "few museums that could afford the hoard would contemplate
buying it without knowing the truth about its discovery and subsequent
history-none of which emerged in court." Id. As Boylan points out,
"revealing the truth about the Sevso Treasure's origin would almost
inevitably result in further legal action by the declared country of origin."
Id. The triumph of Lord Northampton thus may be short-lived. If it is true,
as Lord Northampton claims, that Christie's auction house has agreed to sell
the silver, then we may soon know whether Boylan is correct. See
Checkland & Pierce, supra note 1, at 6; Davies, supra note 5, at 1; D'Arcy,
supra note 1.
Ironically, Lord Northampton began buying the silver pieces over a
decade ago at the suggestion of the late Sir Peter Wilson, former Chairman
of Sotheby's. It is believed that Wilson may at one time have worked as a
Soviet spy, adding still more intrigue to the case of the Sevso Treasure. See
Davies, supra note 5, at 1.
, 4 Although Lord Northampton has triumphed for the time being, there
remains a high probability that the Sevso Treasure was exported (and
excavated, for that matter) illegally from a country like Lebanon. This issue
remains undecided, however, due to the withdrawal of the Republic of
Lebanon from the lawsuit. See supra notes 1 and 13 (describing the
rationale for including the Sevso Treasure in the category of plundered art).
' See Judith Plouviez, Letter: Better Protection for Archaeological Sites,
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houses have profitable outposts). The other involves the
illegal export"6 of works of art, often classified by the country
from which they have been taken as "cultural property." The
removal of cultural property may be tantamount in some cases
to cultural eradication, especially on a large scale such as is
now occurring in the countries of the former Soviet Union.'
Removal of cultural artifacts also has been a major problem for
many years in Latin America' and other geographic areas
famous for their archaeological sites.'
Although it is inherently difficult to calculate the
magnitude of the illicit international trade in art,"0 the
THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 1, 1993, at 18 (arguing, as Secretary of The British
Archaeological Trust, for better protection of archaeological sites and noting
that "[olbjects looted from historic sites all over the world constantly pass
through London's sale rooms-good for trade figures but bad for the national
image.").
" It is important to recognize the difference between the concept of
illegal export and outright theft. Although in certain situations, a country
may wish to claim that illegally exported works of art are "stolen," this has
not been the view traditionally espoused in U.S. jurisprudence. See infra
note 55.
'" See John Carvel, Pillagers with an Eye for Profit Strip the Former
Soviet Bloc of its Artistic Heritage as 'Cultural Cleansing' to Order Sweeps
Over Central and Eastern Europe; John Carvel in Prague Reports on an
Illicit Trade Filling Antique Shops in an Indifferent Western Europe, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 15, 1993, at 22 (quoting Jaroslav Zavadsky, head
of the Czech police art squad, who estimates that"[slince 1990... each year
between 15,000 and 20,000 cultural items have been stolen in the Czech
Republic and exported abroad," and Pavel Jiraseck of the Czech culture
ministry who estimates that "another 15,000 to 20,000 cultural items were
illegally smuggled out last year by people evading the law which requires
an export licence for cultural property").
"' See infra note 112, describing the plundering of Mayan artifacts from
Guatemala.
" See, e.g., Norman Hammond, Antiquities at Sotheby's are Looted, Says
Professor, THE TIMES (London), June 30, 1990, at 2; Alf Siewers, Stolen
Antiquities: Shadowy Network of Looters, Dealers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 21, 1981, at 7.
'* See Stanley Meisler, Art & Avarice; In the Cutthroat Art Trade,
Museums and Collectors Battle Newly Protective Governments Over Stolen
Treasures, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1989, (Magazine), at 8 (quoting Constance
Lowenthal, Executive Director of the International Foundation for Art
Research ("IFAR"), concerning the difficulty of measuring "illicit traffic").
The term "illicit trade" will be used in this Comment to refer both to the
trade in stolen art works and to the trade in works that have been illegally
exported (including illegal excavations) from their country of origin. The
volume of illicit trade has escalated in recent years for a number of reasons.
Chief among these has been the increase in value of many works of art,
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consensus is that this illicit trade is worth billions of dollars
per year,2 ' second only to international drug trafficking in
the amount of money involved.22  It has persisted for
decades2 and shows no signs of abating in the near
future,24 particularly because prices in the art market remain
especially antiquities (which present a special enforcement problem due to
the large number of unexcavated sites around the world and the difficulty
of preventing grave robbers and thieves from conducting their own
"excavations" to increase the inventory of works available for sale on the
world market).
Another reason for the growth in the volume of illicit trade is the
practice of many art-rich countries, such as Mexico, of passing statutes
vesting title in the State to all unexcavated objects and concurrently
prohibiting all export of such "cultural property." See Mary McKenna,
Comment, Problematic Provenance: Toward a Coherent United States Policy
on the International Trade in Cultural Property, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L.
83, 94 (1991) (noting that the "exponential increase in illegal trafficking in
cultural property reflects not just a surge in activity among art thieves and
smugglers, but an expanded concept of'illicit trade'"). Some commentators
believe that such all-encompassing title-vesting and embargo legislation
merely serves to create a thriving black market in the cultural property
sought to be protected. See, e.g., PAUL M. BATOR, THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN ART 42-43 (1983) ("The black market, in sum, is a product of
scarcity. Buyers are willing to pay the 'cost' of conniving in illegal export
because there is no alternative supply; if legal export were permitted, the
illegal market would shrink."). Unfortunately, as Bator points out,
"[e]mbargo, whether explicitly or administratively imposed [through the
paucity of export certificates granted by the State], is the dominating
philosophy of almost all the states rich in antiquities and archaeological
materials...." Id at 39.
" See James Walsh, It's a Steal: The World's Cultural Heritage is Being
Looted by Thieves Who Often Have Ties to Organized Crime-and Even Get
Help from the Art World, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 86, 87 (quoting Constance
Lowenthal, Executive Director of IFAR: "[A]rt theft is a $2 billion-a-year
business" and a British magazine estimating the true value at six billion
dollars a year); see also Thieves Plunder Egypt's Tombs, Dealers Sell
Treasures Worldwide, Agence France Presse, Aug. 18, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File ("The worldwide market for all stolen art
is estimated at three billion dollars annually and growing-which is second
only to drug trafficking .... ").
2 Alexander Stille, Was This Statue Stolen?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988,
at 1 (noting that traffic in stolen or smuggled art is "second only to drugs in
the world's black-market economy"). Computer theft now may fall
somewhere in between the two, however. See Walsh, supra note 21, at 87;
see also Sydney M. Drum, Comment, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New
York a Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 909, 909 & n.8 (1989)
(citing Milton Esterow, Confessions of an Art Cop, ARTNEWS, May 1988, at
134).
2 3 See BATOR, supra note 20, at 1-2.
2
' But see Peter Watson, A Look Inside the Shadowy and Arcane World
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lucrative for the would-be sellers of plundered treasure."
There is no doubt that "[pilundered treasures are in wide
circulation. Looters, according to some estimates, steal a piece
of art or memento of history from Italy [alone] every half-
hour."' The problems presented by the theft or plundering
of cultural artifacts are magnified by the fact that the recovery
rate for such works is extremely low.2 '
This Comment will discuss and critique two major
international efforts aimed at curbing the trade in stolen and
illegally exported works of art.2" The first is the 1970 United
of Art Theft; Why Do Thieves Steal Paintings Too Famous to Sell?, S.F.
EXAMINER, Nov. 28, 1993, at A20 (quoting Harold Smith, the head of Smith
International Adjustors in New York City, who notes that thefts have
declined since the 1980s). This assessment most likely has no bearing on
the volume of illegal excavations and exportations of cultural property from
art-rich nations, a phenomenon outside the scope of insurance claims for
thefts of works of art.
25 As one well-known commentator has written, the "theft of art
treasures... [is] a growth industry fueled by the steep escalation in the
price of art." BATOR, supra note 20, at 17. See also Drum, supra note 22,
at 909 ("Glittering prices ... attract not only legitimate but also illicit
trade."); Leah E. Eisen, Commentary, The Missing Piece: A Discussion of
Theft, Statutes of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art World, 81 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067-68 (1991) (noting that the rise in prices
has "fueled the trafficking of stolen art and artifacts").
This escalation in the prices paid for works of art was especially well-
publicized following many of the sales held by auction houses such as
Sotheby's and Christie's beginning in the late 1980s. For example, Van
Gogh's Irises sold for an astonishing $53.9 million in 1987.' Suzanne
Muchnic, Price Shatters Old Mark by More than $10 Million: Van Gogh
Painting 'Irises'Brings Record $53.9 Million, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 1987, § 1,
at 27. In May 1990, Van Gogh's Portrait of Dr. Gachet broke that earlier
record and sold for $82.5 million, becoming "the most expensive work of art
ever sold at auction." Rebecca Freligh, Auction House Chief Knows Value
of Things, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 24, 1993, at 2C.
26 See Meisler, supra note 20, at 10.
27 According to IFAR, 80-90% of stolen works of art are never recovered
or returned to their rightful owners. Florence Squassi Swanstrom,
Professional Art Thieves-Who and Why?, IFAR REP. AND ART Loss REG.,
June 1993, at 5; see also Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art,
Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J. 17, 18 n.4 (1993) ("According to
recent estimates, worldwide art thefts trebled in 1991, while recovery rates
fell from 22% to only 5%.").
" This Comment is premised upon the theory that the illicit
international trade in works of art is problematic and that there should be
some means of reducing it while still promoting the legitimate flow of works
of art through the world market. Plunder and looting, however, occasionally
have proved advantageous (e.g., for the physical preservation of the objects
[Vol. 15:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/4
ILLICIT TRADE IN CULTURAL PROPERTY
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO") Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Elicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property."9 The second is the draft
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
("UNIDROIT")30 Convention on the International Return of
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. 1  Both
themselves). See, eg., John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of ThinkingAbout
Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 848 n.59 (1986) (noting that
"illegal excavations may reveal important works that would otherwise
remain hidden; smuggling may save works that would otherwise be
destroyed through covetous neglect; the laws prohibiting export may be
senselessly overinclusive"). One example of this phenomenon is the
"transfer" of the Elgin Marbles from the Acropolis in Athens to the British
Museum in London. Had the sculptures remained in situ, the heavy smog
of metropolitan Athens likely would have caused a significant amount of
irreparable damage. Id. at 846.
" UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov.
14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention],
reprinted in 1 THE PROTECTION OF MOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY:
COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE TEXTs 357 (UNESCO 1984) [hereinafter
UNESCO COMPENDIUM]. This compendium reproduces the text and
includes an analysis of much of the national and international legislation
promulgated in the effort to protect movable cultural property, which is
defined here to include "products of archaeological excavations, pictures,
statues, sculptures, books, ancient and modern works of art, [and] scientific
collections...." Id. at 15.
30 UNIDROITis "an organization of 50 nations dedicated to harmonizing
the laws of different countries." Constance Lowenthal, Unidroit Draft
Convention: New Agreement Proposed for Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, IFAR REP., Aug.-Sept. 1991, at 5 (providing a detailed
background on the development of the draft Convention and its goals).
31 Draft UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
See Appendix, containing the text of the most recent draft of the UNIDROIT
Convention.
It appears that UNESCO originally commissioned UNIDROIT in 1984
to examine the possibility of replacing Article 7(b), the portion of the 1970
Convention which discusses private law measures. See Richard Crewdson,
Putting Life into a Cultural Property Convention-UNIDROIT: Still Some
Way to Go, 17 INT'L LEGAL PRACTITIONER 45 (1992). As a result, the draft
UNIDROIT Convention should be viewed as a response to the flaws of its
predecessor. It is, however, based on many of the same principles guiding
UNESCO, including an overriding interest in the preservation of the world's
cultural property.
The author wishes to thank Stephen K. Urice for providing access to his
files on the UNIDROIT Convention, including copies of the various drafts
and related correspondence. To my knowledge, these materials are not yet
1994]
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conventions are examples of a growing worldwide realization
that protection of works of art is necessary on an international
level:
In many countries protective measures were triggered
off by a continuous exodus of works of art; in a number
of countries, such as China, Turkey, Greece or Italy,
archeological works of art, taken out of the country,
resulted from wild and unscientific digs .... One of
the major aims of the Unesco [sic] Convention from
1970 is to put a stop to this pilfering of national
cultural heritage."
Section 2 of this Comment discusses the UNESCO
Convention generally. Section 2.1 identifies the more
significant shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention. Section
2.2 discusses the role of the United States in changing the
original language of the draft UNESCO Convention. Section
3 examines the implementation of the UNESCO Convention
domestically through the Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act and suggests that this statute actually
undermines certain protections contained in the UNESCO
Convention. Section 4 discusses the draft UNIDROIT
Convention and evaluates its likely effectiveness in addressing
the shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention. This Comment
concludes by first noting that the UNESCO Convention has
not and will not be effective on its own in protecting works of
art from illegal trafficking.3 Although reform of some kind
publicly available due to the unofficial nature of the documents. But see
Lyndel V. Prott, The Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 160, 168 (1992)
(appendix includes text of draft convention Study LXX - Doc. 19 dated
August 1990). All other UNIDROIT documents, including previous drafts
of the Convention, are on file with the author.
"2 Hans Koenig, Freedom of Collectors to Sell or Give Away All or Part
of Their Collections, in INTERNATIONAL ART TRADE AND LAW 157, 163
(Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds., 1991).
" See Lowenthal, supra note 30, at 6 (noting that the UNESCO
Convention "has been a disappointment to observers who hoped it would
reduce the trade in smuggled and plundered antiquities"); Urice, supra note
4, at 7 (noting that "for a variety of reasons, the [UNESCO] Convention...
[has] had little noticeable effect on the illicit trade in the very properties the
treaty was meant to protect").
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clearly is necessary, 4 this Comment nevertheless predicts
that the draft UNIDROIT Convention itself will achieve only
limited success in curbing the illicit trade in works of art, even
in the unlikely event that it is ratified and implemented by the
major art-importing and art-exporting states. 5
2. THE UNESCO CONVENTION
The UNESCO Convention represents an effort to use the
channels of public international law to curb the illicit trade in
art. Under the UNESCO Convention, each contracting state
"4 See Linda F. Pinkerton, former Secretary and Trust Counsel, The J.
Paul Getty Trust, Remarks on UNIDROIT Treaty for ALI-ABA Course of
Study on the Legal Problems of Museum Administration 1 (Mar. 20, 1991)
(on file with author) ("The participants in the UNIDROIT meetings which
produced this treaty worked from the premise that the UNESCO Convention
of 1970 ... fails to provide an adequate system for recovery of stolen and
illegally exported objects.").
" The fourth-and probably final-negotiation session for the
UNIDROIT Convention was held September 29-October 8, 1993 in Rome.
Based on current projections, the Convention most likely will be ready for
ratification in late 1995 at a diplomatic conference, although it appeared at
first that ratification might occur by the end of 1994. See Letter from Linda
F. Pinkerton, former Secretary and Trust Counsel, The J. Paul Getty Trust,
to Stephen K. Urice, Director, The Rosenbach Museum and Library, (Oct.
21, 1993) (on file with author) ("There will be a diplomatic conference in late
1994 from which the final text of the ... [Convention] will emerge .... ").
It is almost certain, however, that implementing legislation will need to be
passed in the United States before the provisions of the Convention can be
considered effective. If the 12-year delay between adoption of the UNESCO
Convention and passage of implementing legislation in the United States is
any indication of a pattern, then it could be well into the 21st century before
the UNIDROIT Convention is in force, at least in the United States. See
Memorandum from Harold S. Burman, Executive Director, Advisory
Committee on Private International Law, Department of State, Office of the
Legal Adviser re: Request for Comments on the Revised Draft UNIDROIT
Convention on the International Protection of Cultural Property; U.S.
Positions for the Fourth UNIDROIT Meeting 1 (Aug. 26, 1993) (on file with
author), which notes:
If the diplomatic conference were to produce a final treaty text, it
would then be up to each individual country to determine whether
to seek ratification. Ratification by the United States is likely to be
conditioned on enactment by Congress of implementing legislation,
as was the case with U.S. ratification of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.
1994]
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itself is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the
Convention through its own government.
3 6
2.1. Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention
Commentators have observed that "[tihe UNESCO
Convention has been criticized because of its cumbersome
procedures, because it has not been effective in protecting the
cultural property of its member countries, and because it can
never be fully effective, since the vast majority of the art-
importing countries are not signatories to it.""7 Generally,
the UNESCO Convention is viewed as a weak piece of
legislation without the "teeth" to prevent the widespread
plundering and looting of valuable works of art around the
world or to punish individuals caught violating its terms.
As indicated above, one of the major reasons the UNESCO
Convention failed to provide an adequate enforcement
mechanism is the fact that significant art-importing nations
are not signatories.3 8 Currently, of the seventy-three 9 total
signatories to the UNESCO Convention, the United States is
the only significant art-market nation to have accepted and
implemented it. 40 The remainder of the signatories to the
UNESCO Convention are countries rich in cultural property
36 See UNESCO COMPENDIUM, supra note 29, at 22 ("Each State that is
a party to the [UNESCO] Convention is responsible for the regulation of
such transactions [involving cultural property] and for deciding whether
they are licit or illicit."); see also Crewdson, supra note 31, at 45 (noting
that the UNESCO Convention was "essentially a public law measure
requiring substantial state resources to administer, involving legislation,
education, [and] certification of exports").
3 7 RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR
COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 158 (1992 Update).
38 See Patricia Hambrecht, Comments on Draft UNIDROIT Convention
on the Return of Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects for meeting
of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law
2 (Oct. 16, 1992) (on file with author) ("[M]ost of [the members of the United
States delegation to UNIDROIT] believe that [the UNESCO Convention] has
been a failure-in large part because nearly all of the European art-
importing countries failed to ratify it because of difficulties in
implementation.").
8 See Robert Adams, Smithsonian Horizons, SMITHSONIAN, July 1993,
at 10.
4 See id. Neither France, England, Japan, nor any of the other major
art-importing states has signed the UNESCO Convention or indicated a
willingness to abide by its provisions.
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that stand to lose a great deal as a result of the illicit
international trade in art.
The art-market countries, which generally have refused to
sign the Convention,4' probably were influenced by the
importance of the art trade to their economies. In this regard,
the persuasive effect of arguments voiced by art dealers and
other members of the trade ' that signing the UNESCO
Convention would merely deflect profitable business to another
non-signatory nation should not be underestimated.
43
Without the presence of some international source of law
binding the art-market nations, however, art-exporting
countries have little chance of combatting the problem of the
illicit trade in works of art." This imbalance in the nature
of the countries bound by the provisions of the UNESCO
Convention is not its only weakness, however.
2.1.1. Textual Weaknesses
Although the UNESCO Convention consists of a total of
twenty-six articles, most of these provisions are mere
rhetoric45  and thus impose no real requirements on
41 See id.
41 See Geoffrey Lewis, International Issues Concerning Museum
Collections, in INTERNATIONAL ART TRADE AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL SALES
OF WORKS OF ART III 73, 76 (Martine Briat & Judith A. Freedberg eds.,
1991) (jlIlt is widely believed among curators that there is a strong lobby
from the art trade against the 1970 [UNESCO] Convention.").
41 See William Grimes, The Antiquities Boom-Who Pays the Price?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 17, 24 (quoting art dealer Andr6
Emmerich: "'It all goes to Geneva now. Don't kid yourself. The market
continues, but not here.'").
4' The problem is further magnified by the confusing array of different
national laws regarding cultural property. As one commentator has noted:
All of the major art importing countries-and exporting
countries as well-have what has been called an "international
hodgepodge of laws [that] can be a tremendous advantage to people
who wish to move and sell stolen art"; few if any penalties are in
practice attached to its acquisition. Prevailingly, the developed
countries continue to tolerate, and sometimes even celebrate,
commerce in the cultural patrimony of less-wealthy nations. And
the seemingly insatiable demand is such that the countries
suffering the greatest losses cannot by themselves bring to an end
this source of international discord.
Adams, supra note 39, at 10.
' See generally BATOR, supra note 20, at 100-03 (examining the
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signatories.48 Typical of such well-meaning but impotent
provisions is Article 2,' which essentially sets forth the
principle that illicit trade in cultural property is
undesirable," that it deprives source countries of their
cultural heritage49  and rightful property,50  and that
international cooperation is an effective means of controlling
the problem.5 ' The article goes on to note ambiguously"
that the states signing the Convention will oppose illicit
import, export, and other types of transactions "with the
means at their disposal."" This last phrase is particularly
ironic. It could have had a positive impact if the wealthy art-
market nations of the world had signed the Convention, as
these countries possess the "means" (i.e., money, influence,
etc.) to combat the problem. Instead, it is the victims of the
plunder who are being urged to help themselves, while the rest
of the world looks on, unable to help or simply uninterested in
the problem.
2.2. The Role of the United States
In addition to the fact that a number of its provisions are
ambiguous and that it contains a number of articles without
real substance, the weaknesses of the UNESCO Convention
also may be attributed, at least in part, to the actions of the
U.S. delegation,54 which played a crucial role in the deletion
of the provision in Article 7 of the original UNESCO
rhetorical nature of various articles).4 6Id.





52 See id. art. 2(2) ("To this end, the States Parties [to the UNESCO
Convention] undertake to oppose such practices with the means at their
disposal, and particularly by removing their causes, putting a stop to
current practices, and by helping to make the necessary reparations.").
53 IdL
r" It is likely that the U.S. delegation was responding to the same type
of lobbying and other persuasive efforts of the U.S. art community that was
evident during the battle to pass implementing legislation in Congress. See
infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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Convention covering illegally exported cultural property.5 5
As it originally stood, the Secretariat Draft"' of the UNESCO
Convention57 would have obligated signatory nations-a
category in which the United States clearly wished to be
included 5 -- to respect and enforce the export laws of other
"" Illegal exportation should be distinguished from illegal importation.
The legality of the former is judged by the laws of the country of export,
whereas the legality of the latter is judged by the laws of the importing
country. The general rule-true in the United States, England, France,
Germany, and Switzerland, among other places-is that illegal export does
not by itself bar legal importation:
The fact that an art object has been illegally exported does not in
itself bar it from lawful importation into the United States; illegal
export does not itself render the importer (or one who took from
him) in any way actionable in a U.S. court; the possession of an art
object cannot be lawfully disturbed in the United States solely
because it was illegally exported from another country.
BATOR, supra note 20, at 11.
On occasion, this general rule has been qualified. See infra section 3.2
regarding import restrictions and emergency bans under the U.S.
implementing legislation; see also United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
Both cases involved the application of the National Stolen Property Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (1970 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter NSPA], which applies to the
interstate or foreign commerce of any stolen goods valued at $5,000 or more.
McClain, 545 F.2d at 992. In order to be convicted under the NSPA, the
defendants must have had knowledge (i.e., scienter) that they were dealing
in goods that were "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." Id. (quoting
NSPA).
Although the original conviction of the McClain defendants in district
court was reversed due to the vagueness of the Mexican statute regarding
state ownership, the case left open the possibility that foreign laws could be
used in a U.S. court to convict individuals involved in art trafficking. In
order for such a conviction to occur, however, it must be clear that: 1) the
objects come from the state in question, and 2) an unambiguous declaration
of state ownership has been made via statute. McClain, 545 F.2d at 993,
997. Without both of these elements present, a U.S. court will refuse to
convict. Cf. Government of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal.
1989), aff'd sub nom., Government of Peru v. Wendt, No. 90-55521, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 10385 (9th Cir. May 6, 1991) (noting, inter alia, that Peru
failed to show that the artifacts had originated in modern-day Peru).
" BATOR, supra note 20, at 52 & n.94 (using the term Secretariat Draft
to denote the original version of the UNESCO Convention and noting that
the Secretariat Draft is printed in MEANS OF PROHIBITING AND PREVENTING
THE ILLICIT IMPORT, EXPORT AND TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF CULTURAL
PROPERTY, UNESCO Doc. SHC/MD/5, Annex III (1970)).
" See id. at 94-100 (describing in some detail the legislative history and
drafting process of the UNESCO Convention).
58 See 3 LYNDEL V. PROTT & P.J. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL
HERITAGE 727 (1989) ("[T]he changing political composition of all the
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nations.5" This policy would have contradicted long-
established norms of U.S. and other art-importing countries'
law in this area."0 Inclusion of this provision would have
meant that a U.S. federal court faced with a claim by a foreign
nation for repatriation, for instance, would have been forced to
conclude that any object considered to have been illegally
exported from the source country be returned. This would
have been the case even if importation into the United States
was in full compliance with applicable domestic laws and the
possessor bought the work in good faith.
Such a provision has been called a "'blank check' rule"1
because it essentially gives art-exporting countries carte
blanche to enact whatever type of export laws they wish,"2
which may lead to their blocking export of objects that may or
may not be culturally significant. The blank check rule allows
exporting nations to override other countries' (particularly
importing countries)"3 judgments about what types of cultural
property should remain in situ in order to preserve their
national heritage. Such a policy also opens up the very real
danger of unnecessarily choking the legal market" for works
of art, creating strong incentives for illegal excavations,
exportations, and export licenses 5 and contributing to the
development of a thriving black market.6 "
international organizations in the late 1960s motivated [the U.S.]
government to seek better relations with a number of developing States
See BATOR, supra note 20, at 95. Bator notes:
[The Secretariat Draft's] central provisions (in article 7) required
every country party to the Convention (a) to prohibit the export of
any item of 'cultural property' unless accompanied by an export
certificate; and (b) to prohibit the importation of any item of
'cultural property' not 'accompanied' by such a certificate-that is,
which was illegally exported.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
60 See supra note 55.
61 BATOR, supra note 20, at 52.
62 id
63 Id.
64 Id at 53.
"5 Md. at 54.
66 This conclusion is based on the assumption that, given complete
control over export policy, most, if not all, art-rich nations will enact total
embargoes in an effort to preserve their vanishing cultural heritage. As
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This aspect of the Secretariat Draft would have been a
major-and, as it turned out, an unacceptable 6 --change in
U.S. policy regarding cultural property. Interestingly, this
change in the language of Article 7 has done nothing to stem
the controversy surrounding the issue of recognition of foreign
export laws:
At the heart of recent debates about the international
traffic in art has been the demand of the art-exporting
countries that the United States (and other art-
importing countries) abandon the general rule and bar
the import of all art objects whose export was itself not
legally authorized. The demand is based on the claim
that the responsibility for the ineffectiveness of export
controls rests with the art-importing countries, which
subvert these controls by allowing the import of
illegally exported art.... ."
With regard to illegally exported works of art, the final
version of Article 76" obligates States Parties to the
Bator points out, such embargo policies actually are counterproductive, as
they lead generally to a well-developed black market system in which
cultural property leaves the source country in spite of its export laws. See
BATOR, supra note 20, at 41-43 (section entitled "The ineffectiveness of
embargo: Ten easy lessons on how to create a black market.").
' Id. at 96. Both the museum community and art dealers believed that
such a restriction on the art trade would put museums and other buyers in
too vulnerable a position and would virtually dry up the market in the
United States. See also PROTT & O'KEEFE, supra note 58, at 745-46 (noting
that the U.S. delegation succeeded in inserting an amendment to the
provision which limited its coverage to state-run museums); Grimes, supra
note 43, at 24 (quoting Andr6 Emmerich).
68 BATOR, supra note 20, at 51-52.
68 Article 7, which is one of the two most important articles in the
UNESCO Convention (the other being Article 9) provides as follows:
The States Parties to this Convention undertake:
(a) To take the necessary measures, consistent with national
legislation, to prevent museums and similar institutions
within their territories from acquiring cultural property
originating in another State Party which has been illegally
exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the
States concerned. Whenever possible, to inform a State of
origin Party to this Convention of an offer of such cultural
property illegally removed from that State after the entry
into force of this Convention in both States;
(b) (i) to prohibit the import of cultural property stolen from a
museum or a religious or secular public monument or
1994]
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Convention to "prevent museums70  and similar
institutions"' from acquiring works of art that fall within the
definition of cultural property in Article 172 and that have
been illegally exported after the effective date of the
Convention ' in the states concerned,"4 but only to the extent
that national legislation would impose the same obligation.5
It is this final qualifying phrase which renders the article moot
in the United States, where it is possible to import something
similar institution in another State Party to this
Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for
the States concerned, provided that such property is
documented as appertaining to the inventory of that
institution; (ii) at the request of the State Party of origin,
to take appropriate steps to recover and return any such
cultural property imported after the entry into force of this
Convention in both States concerned, provided, however,
that the requesting State shall pay just compensation to an
innocent purchaser or to a person who has valid title to
that property. Requests for recovery and return shall be
made through diplomatic offices. The requesting Party
shall furnish, at its expense, the documentation and other
evidence necessary to establish its claim for recovery and
return. The Parties shall impose no customs duties or
other charges upon cultural property returned pursuant to
this Article. All expenses incident to the return and
delivery of the cultural property shall be borne by the
requesting Party.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 7, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
70 Id- art. 7(a). Bator has noted that this provision is the result of a
compromise in the drafting process and that, based on the legislative
history, the only types of museums covered would be those whose policies
are controlled by the federal government. See BATOR, supra note 20, at 103-
04. See also McKenna, supra note 20, at 116 n.158 ("Only publicly owned
museums are within the scope of the CPIA at all.") (citation omitted)
(emphasis omitted).
", UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
It is not exactly clear what is meant by the term "institution" here. Given
the restrictive interpretation of the type of museums covered, it is hard to




7 ,5 Id Note that this limitation provides an instant "out" for the United
States unless and until legislation is passed that changes the general rule.
See supra note 55, noting that generally, an object's illegal exportation does
not by itself bar legal importation.
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legally regardless of whether the item has been legally
exported from its country of origin.7
3. THE CONVENTION ON CULTURAL PROPERTY
IMPLEMENTATION ACT
In addition to the significant actions taken by the U.S.
delegation regarding the text of the UNESCO Convention
itself, U.S. implementation of the UNESCO Convention 77 has
further diluted its potential beneficial impact on the illicit
international trade in art. The causes for this weakening of
the provisions of the Convention are no mystery. Following
the ratification of the UNESCO Convention in 1972 by the
Senate, s there ensued a decade-long battle in Congress
between those who favored protection (e.g., art historians7 "
76 See supra note 55.
w International agreements, such as the UNESCO Convention, which are
non-self-executing, require implementing legislation before they come into
effect in the United States. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 569 (6th ed.
1992). The necessity for implementing legislation is described as follows:
[I]ftreaties contain provisions affecting rights and duties of persons
or bodies under the jurisdiction of the contracting states, each
contracting state is bound to take such steps as are necessary,
according to its internal law, to ensure that their rights and duties
are consistent with the requirements of the treaty.
1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw § 622 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992).
78 BATOR, supra note 20, at 94. Although the "original draft [UNESCO]
Convention included a provision prohibiting reservations ... [t]he Special
Committee of Governmental Experts in 1970, in deciding to make
reservations possible, clearly accepted the view that there would be varying
degrees of implementation." VON GLAHN, supra note 77, at 568. It is not
unusual for a reservation to change the text of a treaty: "Reservations are
changes or amendments inserted into a treaty by one party as an implied or
specified condition of ratification." Id. at 776.
The Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the
UNESCO Convention on August 11, 1972, subject to one reservation and six
understandings regarding the implementation and interpretation of the
Convention. See 118 CONG. REc. 27,924-25 (1972). The reservation
specifies that "[t]he United States reserves the right to determine whether
or not to impose export controls over cultural property." Id. at 27,925. The
Senate discussed Articles 7 and 9 of the Convention only during its
deliberations, thereby placing narrow limits on the coverage of the
implementing legislation to be enacted in the future. PROTT & O'KEEFE,
supra note 58, at 781.
"" Irvin Molotsky, Bill to Curtail Stolen-Art Trade is Near Passage, N.Y.
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and archaeologists") and those who did not (e.g., art
dealers"l). The resulting watered-down version of the
UNESCO Convention embodied in the U.S. implementing
legislation therefore can be explained by the necessity of
having to compromise in order to enact the statute at all, let
alone in the most effective form possible.
The twelve-year delay between the adoption of the
UNESCO Convention in late 197082 and the passage of the
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act ("the
Act")8" by Congress at the beginning of 1983 provides
conclusive evidence of the strength and influence of the art
lobby in the United States." This influence is further
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1982, at C14 ("Since 1970, the main proponents of the
convention have been archeological, historical and anthropological
associations concerned over the flight of the poor countries' patrimony to the
West and concerned also over the destruction of the historical record that
occurs when ancient sites are pillaged.").
80 Id.
"' See id. ("Opposition has come from many art dealers, exporters and
collectors, and from some museums."); Margot Slade & Wayne Biddle, Ideas
and Trends: Breakthrough on Stolen Artifacts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1982,
at E14 ("Dealers' fears of lost business and the sentiment of art historians
hoping to protect the patrimony of disadvantaged nations kept the
legislation stuck for a decade.").
8" The UNESCO Convention was adopted November 14, 1970. See 823
U.N.T.S. at 231.
83 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2613 (1988 & Supp. 1994). The Act is the result of
12 years of prolonged negotiation and compromise among politicians, art
dealers, museums, et al., following the adoption ofthe UNESCO Convention.
It essentially implements Articles 7 and 9 of the UNESCO Convention, but
it is not retroactive in effect and, therefore, only covers those items stolen
after April 12, 1983, which is the effective date of the Act.
"" See George Lardner, Jr., The Pillaging of Global Art Treasures, WASH.
PosT, May 18, 1977, at Al, A8 (quoting a statement by Edward H. Merrin,
a well-known New York City art dealer, to the House Ways and Means
Trade Subcommittee: "With the passage of this law, the entire flow of art
will be to the European collecting countries, Japan and the Arab oil
states."); see also Molotsky, supra note 79, at E14 ("[D]ealers, through their
allies in Congress, effectively blocked legislationimplementing the treaty for
the last 10 years."); Slade & Biddle, supra note 81, at E14 (noting the delay
caused by the concerns of art dealers, private collectors, and some
museums).
Ironically, it was Merrin who paid the highest price to date, $2.09
million, for a classical antiquity at auction at Sotheby's in December 1988.
The piece was a marble Cycladic head that had been purchased only 25
years earlier by a Swiss couple for a mere $12,000. Grimes, supra note 43,
at 17. Merrin was funded through a partnership agreement with Asher B.
Edelman, a "freewheeling corporate raider." Id. The transaction created a
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demonstrated by the weaknesses inherent in the U.S.
implementing legislation, which actually "implements" only
two of the most important articles of the UNESCO Convention,
Articles 7 and 9.85
3.1. Implementing Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention
As noted above,86 Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention
already had been weakened by eliminating the obligation of
importing states to return works that were illegally exported.
Despite this basic limitation on the effectiveness of the
UNESCO Convention, it nevertheless is worth examining
§ 2606 of the Act,87 the portion of the statute enacting Article
7 of the UNESCO Convention. Section 2606 requires that
sense of foreboding for those concerned about the ramifications of such
investment agreements on the illicit international trade in antiquities:
For archaeologists, the crack of the auctioneer's hammer
sounded an alarm. They have been at war with the marketplace for
25 years, but the entry of corporate investors brings a new intensity
to the conflict. Archaeologists fear that dirt will fly everywhere
from Peru to Iran as picks, shovels and bulldozers go to work
digging for treasure-and destroying sites. Artifacts, no matter
how beautiful, cannot tell a story unless they are properly
excavated.
Id. at 18. The fear caused by Merrin's purchase appears to be well-founded,
particularly as
[t]here can be no doubt about the close connection between the
international trade in art and the looting of archaeological sites.
Looting occurs because antiquities bring a spiraling price on the
marketplace; the market is primarily international; a vast supply
of looted antiquities flows abroad from the archaeologically rich
countries.
BATOR, supra note 20, at 25. Bator goes on to indicate that looting and
plundering of archaeological sites is particularly difficult to prevent via
legislation or the creation of a legal market for such goods. This is so
because there is an insufficient number of trained experts available to
supervise work at each of the many unexcavated sites around the world and
to ensure the preservation of the important cultural and historical
information derived by keeping objects within their original contexts. Since
the market "sets a higher price on art masterpieces than on the acquisition
of archaeological knowledge," nothing short of physical protection will
effectively keep thieves from looting archaeological sites and, given the
sheer number of sites worldwide, the cost of deterrence is simply too great
for any of the source countries to bear. Id. at 26.
s See supra note 78.
86 See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
87 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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importers obtain an export certificate or other
documentation"8 from states of origin indicating that works
of art falling within the rather narrow definition of
"archaeological or ethnological materia"8 have been exported
legally from the state.9 0  If such a certificate or other
"satisfactory evidence" 1 is unavailable at the time of entry
into the United States, the customs officer involved shall
refuse to release the works of art from custody until the
certificate or other evidence of legal export is provided." Due
to the limited scope of § 2606, however, the impediment
created by the certificate requirement has not been significant.
3.2. Implementing Article 9 of the UNESCO Convention
Due to the moot quality of Article 7 in the United States,
the most important article of the UNESCO Convention
arguably is Article 9. Article 9 provides an avenue for States
Parties to the UNESCO Convention to request assistance from
one another when their cultural heritage is severely
threatened. 4 These requests may be made only by countries
88 Id. § 2606(a).
" Id. The term is defined at the beginning of the Act. See 19 U.S.C.
§ 2601(2) (Supp. 1994). In particular, it is worth noting that the scope of
objects covered by the Act is much narrower than that envisioned by the
language of Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention. Article 7 refers simply
to "cultural property," which is broadly defined in Article 1. UNESCO
Convention, supra note 29, art. 1, 823 U.N.T.S. at 234-36. In contrast, the
Act states that only objects which are at least 250 years old will qualify as
material of "archaeological interest" subject to the import restrictions in
§ 2606. See 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2) (Supp. 1994).
0 Id. § 2606(a).
", I& § 2606(b)(2). The phrase "satisfactory evidence" is defined later in
the section. See § 2606(c).
,2 Id § 2606(b).
"sId.
" Article 9 provides as follows:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials
may call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States
Parties to this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to
participate in a concerted international effort to determine and to
carry out the necessary concrete measures, including the control of
exports and imports and international commerce in the specific
materials concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned
shall take provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent
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that also are signatories to the UNESCO Convention.
Additionally, "[t]he countries applying for help have to supply
specific evidence of pillaging" 5 in order to obtain assistance
from the United States.
As codified in the Act at §§ 2602-2604, 96 a State Party
may petition the United States under Article 9 of the UNESCO
Convention 7  for an agreement, either bilateral" or
multilateral, " to apply import restrictions on "archaeological
or ethnological material... the pillage of which is creating the
jeopardy to the cultural patrimony of the State Party....,oo
Such a request must be accompanied by a written statement
of the facts describing the problem and the reasons for the
request for assistance.10 ' Any agreement entered into
pursuant to § 2602 may not last longer than five years0 2 but
the President"' may extend the agreement for additional
five-year periods' 4 if the circumstances warranting the
restrictions still exist0 5 and there is no cause for suspension
of the agreement."° Although it is preferable not to enter
into any such agreement without the concurrent
implementation of similar import restrictions by other art-
importing nations,"° the President may do so if he or she
determines that it still would be beneficial.' s
irremediable injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 9, 823 U.N.T.S. at 242.
"' Stille, supra note 22, at 1.
,6 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602-2604 (1983).
97 Id. § 2602(a)(1).
$a Id. § 2602(a)(2)(A).
99 Id. § 2602(a)(2)(B).
,"Id. § 2602(a)(2)(A).
'' Id. § 2602(a)(3).
12 Id. § 2602(b).
03 Note that many of the responsibilities conferred on the President
under the Act have been "delegated to the Director of the United States
Information Agency, acting in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of the Treasury .... " Exec. Order No. 12,555, 51 Fed. Reg.
8475 (1986), reprinted in 19 U.S.C.A. § 2602 at 257-58 (Supp. 1994).
' 19 U.S.C. § 2602(e) (1983).
' 5 Id. § 2602(e)(1).
"Id. § 2602(e)(2). See id. § 2602(d) (regarding the conditions under
which agreements are suspended).
'7 Id. § 2602(c)(1).
*s Id, § 2602(c)(2).
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In addition to the agreements provided for in § 2602 above,
outright bans on the importation of specific types of cultural
property may be implemented pursuant to § 2603.109 In
order for this to occur, an "emergency condition"" ° must
exist."' Although this provision has been used in the past
decade," 2 it has been criticized for its complexity and undue
bureaucratic requirements."' In addition, such emergency
import bans do nothing to protect cultural property not
threatened by the existence of an "emergency condition."
4. THE PROMISE OF THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION
It is apparent that the UNESCO Convention has not
curtailed successfully the illicit trafficking in cultural property,
either in the United States or elsewhere. Moreover,
[i]t... [has] offered nothing to those who were trying
to tackle the huge problem of illicit international trade
in cultural objects stolen from individuals and its
attempts to control illegal export took no account of the
10" Id. § 2603. Although § 2603 itself does not explicitly mention bans,
they effectively would result under § 2606 since any State Party claiming
the existence of an emergency condition warranting import restrictions will
not issue export licenses for such material. Without the necessary license
or other evidence sufficient to demonstrate legal exportation, all designated
cultural property will be seized by the Customs Service upon entry into the
United States. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 2606 and supra notes 86-93 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements under § 2606).
0 19 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1983).
111 Id. § 2603(b).
12 It appears to have been used a total of three times. See William H.
Honan, U.S. Returns Stolen Ancient Textiles to Bolivia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1992, § 1, at 23. For example, in 1991, following a boom in the market
for Mayan objects, the United States acted to ban the further importation
of ancient Maya artifacts from Guatemala pursuant to the provisions of the
Act. See, e.g., Norman Hammond, U.S. Acts to Halt Plunder of Guatemala's
History, THE TIMES (London), May 6, 1991, at 17 (discussing one instance
in which the provision has been used); Stanley Meisler, U.S. Bans Importing
of Mayan Artifacts; Archeology: Action Taken to Preserve the Famed Peten
Region of Guatemala, One of the Richest and Most Plundered Sites, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1991, at A26 ("Americans are the most avid collectors of
Mayan and other artifacts and works of art [from Guatemala]. U.S. officials
implied that they hoped the legal prohibition would embarrass American
museums and private collectors enough to dry up the market.").
"' See Black Market Flourishes Despite Law on Art Relics, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 28, 1985, at 14D.
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very wide difference in views as to what cultural
property should be allowed to circulate freely in
international markets."4
Many commentators feel that the draft UNIDROIT
Convention presents an innovative and workable mechanism
for controlling the illicit international trade in art.1"5 If the
UNIDROIT Convention is ratified, the most likely result for
contracting states"' will be that the motley assortment of
laws currently governing ownership rights in cultural property
will be preempted" and substantially harmonized in a
114 Crewdson, supra note 31, at 45.
115 See, e.g., LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 37, at 160 ("The draft
UNIDROIT Convention is an original approach that attempts to balance the
conflicting interests of art-exporting and art-importing countries with
respect to the protection of cultural property."). See also Claudia Fox,
Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in
Cultural Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 225, 232, 266-67 (1993)
(stating, inter alia, that the Convention "would significantly deter illicit art
trade without damaging free trade in art").
11I For the purposes of this Comment, the term "contracting state" refers
to any nation that has ratified or otherwise accepted a convention.
7 As it stands now, the draft UNIDROIT Convention makes no explicit
statement regarding preemption of national laws. Nonetheless, Article 10
cryptically provides that: "Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a
Contracting State from applying any rules more favourable to the
restitution or the return of a stolen or unlawfully [removed] [exported]
cultural object than provided for by this Convention." See UNIDROIT
Convention, supra note 31, art. 10. Article 10 seems to allow a court in a
contracting state with a longer statute of limitations, for example, to choose
to apply its own limitations period in lieu of the one specified in the
Convention for that particular set of circumstances. A lack of uniformity in
the law may lead plaintiffs to forum shop in order to locate a jurisdiction
more amenable to their claim. Patricia Hambrecht, General Counsel and
Senior Vice President of Christie, Manson & Woods International, Inc. (the
U.S. subsidiary of the international auction house), has indicated that this
would be an unfortunate by-product of the UNIDROIT Convention. She has
stated:
[T]he Convention raises a host of troubling jurisdictional points.
For example, the chilling effect on commercial transactions would
be enormous if an American bidder at auction thought he was
potentially subject to the foreign laws of a foreign country that he
had never even visited, much less conducted business in, by
purchasing a work of art at our Park Avenue galleries. Any
international treaty must preempt more restrictive laws of a
particular Contracting State or else the UNIDROIT Convention's
laudable goal of uniformity will be defeated and prospective
plaintiffs will be encouraged to forum shop.
1994]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
single source."n Collectors, gallery owners, curators, and other
affected parties could then consult this single source, the
UNIDROIT Convention, to determine the legality and
prudence of certain transactions under consideration.
The key to any future success of the final version of the
UNIDROIT Convention ultimately will be to maintain a
balance between the different interests of art-exporting and
art-importing nations."' Without the support of countries
with divergent interests, the UNIDROIT Convention will
match the UNESCO Convention's ineffectiveness, becoming
irrelevant as the plundering of cultural property continues
throughout the world.
4.1. Background
In contrast to the UNESCO Convention, the draft
UNIDROIT Convention approaches the problem of the illicit
trade in cultural objects from the perspective of private
international law. 20 The UNIDROIT Convention effectively
Hambrecht, supra note 38, at 3 (emphasis omitted).
118 Note, however, that this would only be true for claims filed under the
UNIDROIT Convention. See Memorandum from Harold S. Burman,
Executive Director, Office of the Legal Adviser, State Department, to
Advisory Committee on Private International Law on the Status and Issues
in the Draft UNIDROIT Convention on International Return of Cultural
Property (June 3, 1994) [hereinafter 1994 Burman Memorandum] (on file
with author) at 4 (stating that "[r]ecovery actions for stolen property in the
U.S. would presumably proceed wherever possible under existing State law
rather than the Convention, since a plaintiff would not be required to
provide compensation under State law even if BFP [bona fide possessor]
status could be established, unless title had effectively passed").
11 See UNIDROIT Study LXX - Doc. 23, Committee of Governmental
Experts on the International Protection of Cultural Property, Report on the
First Session 1-2 (May 6-10, 1991) [hereinafter Report on UNIDROIT First
Session] (on file with author). The objective was described as follows:
The real challenge facing the committee [of experts] was to strike
an acceptable balance between the interests of the countries of
origin of cultural objects and those of the importing countries and
between countries advocating the development of the art trade and
those following a restrictive policy of cultural nationalism aimed at
the retention of cultural property in the country of origin.
Id.
120 The term "private law" is defined as follows:
That portion of the law which defines, regulates, enforces, and
administers relationships among individuals, associations, and
corporations. As used in contradistinction to public law, the term
[Vol. 15:3
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will endow claimants-foreign nations"2 ' and other
dispossessed owners-with certain rights. These claimants
may in turn invoke these rights when they believe that they
have been wronged and wish to seek redress under the terms
of the UNIDROIT Convention. Since the provisions of the
UNIDROIT Convention do not restrict the definition of "owner"
to public institutions as in the UNESCO Convention,"
claimants, including private individuals, would be permitted
to bring a cause of action in a court located in the country in
means all that part of the law which is administered between citizen
and citizen, or which is concerned with the definition, regulation,
and enforcement of rights in cases where both the person in whom
the right inheres and the person upon whom the obligation is
incident are private individuals.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1196 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). For a
discussion of ownership of cultural property by the state itself, see supra
note 20. When this is the case, under private law-such as that
contemplated by the draft UNIDROIT Convention-the State is treated just
like any other claimant.
"" The consistent reference to countries as "owners" derives from the fact
that many of the works of art that travel in the illicit trade belong to the
state. This ownership may stem from the public nature of the monument
or museum from which the works are taken, but increasingly (within the
past 20 years or so), art-rich nations in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and
Central and South America have passed statutes vesting title to any
unexcavated items in the state so that items "discovered" by looters are
deemed to belong to the state. This explains, in part, the reason for the
language used in the UNESCO Convention in Article 7(b)(i) regarding the
type of cultural property covered by the Convention. See also supra note 20.
"n UNESCO Convention, supra note 29, art. 7(b)(i), 823 U.N.T.S. at 240.
Article 7(b)(i) of the UNESCO Convention makes clear that only works of
art fitting into the definition of "cultural property" set forth in Article 1 that
have been "stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument
or similar institution" are covered by the Convention. Id.
As noted by Bator, this limitation in the coverage of the UNESCO
Convention means that the "acquisition policies of nongovernmental
museums [are] subject only to moral persuasion." BATOR, supra note 20, at
104. But see Boylan, supra note 1, at 20 ("[Virtually every major museum
in the world, and more than 8,500 individual directors, curators and other
museum professionals, have voluntarily bound themselves to work only
within the International Code of Professional Ethics of the International
Council of Museums [("ICOM")], and most have their own internal ethical
and acquisition codes."). Boylan, who is the Vice-President of ICOM and
chaired the committee which drafted its International Code of Professional
Ethics, suggests that despite the apparent weakness of the UNESCO
Convention, museums essentially have established their own internal
enforcement systems requiring due diligence in the acquisitions arena. This
code of ethics, however, has no effect on the actions of private collectors,
gallery owners, and dealers.
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which the items being sought are currently located. For
example, if the works of art are in the possession of a museum
in the United States, the claimant may bring suit in state or
federal court under the draft UNIDROIT Convention in order
to seek enforcement of the rights created by the draft
UNIDROIT Convention in that forum.' 3  Unlike the
enforcement mechanisms provided for in the United States
under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act, which vests enforcement power in government agencies
such as the Customs Office,"M the UNIDROIT Convention
essentially puts the courts-or other competent authorities-in
charge of resolving disputes over cultural property.
As both the title of the draft UNIDROIT Convention and
the text of Article 1.25 demonstrate, the Convention covers
128 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 37, at 159. According to the most
recent draft of the UNIDROIT Convention, Article 9 of Chapter IV, which
covers claims and actions, states in relevant part:
(1) Without prejudice to the rules concerning jurisdiction in force
in the Contracting States, the claimant may in all cases bring
a claim under this Convention before the courts or competent
authorities of the Contracting State where the cultural object
is located.
(2) The parties may also agree to submit the dispute to another
jurisdiction or to arbitration.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, art. 9.
124 19 U.S.C. § 2613. Section 2613 provides as follows:
In the customs territory of the United States, and in the Virgin
Islands, the provisions of this chapter shall be enforced by
appropriate customs officers. In any other territory or area within
the United States, but not within such customs territory or the
Virgin Islands, such provisions shall be enforced by such persons as
may be designated by the President.
Id. (emphasis added).
In 1986 President Reagan delegated all the significant functions
conferred on him by the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act to the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of State, and the
Department of the Treasury (of which the Customs Service is a part),
depending on the specific function concerned. Such delegation to several
different branches of the government can only make enforcement of the Act's
provisions even more inefficient. See Exec. Order No. 12,555, supra note
103, § 2602 (stating in pertinent part that the Secretary of the Interior is
designated to carry out the enforcement functions found in § 2613 of the
Act); see also Customs Directive No. 5230-15 (Apr. 18, 1991) (describing the
applicable statutes and the procedures whereby cultural property is seized
or confiscated).
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only objects that have been transported across national
boundaries. 2 ' As for the definition of "cultural objects,"
Article 2 specifies that they must be of importance "for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science ""'
and refers the reader to Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention
for a list of examples.' This method of definition provides
guidance to the court or other competent authority'29
presented with a claim, but it also leaves it to that body's
discretion to determine whether an object is of the requisite
importance.' As it stands now, the draft UNIDROIT
Convention does not contain an explicit provision concerning
non-retroactivity. It is logical to assume, however, that once
This Convention applies to claims of an international character for
(a) the restitution of stolen cultural objects removed from the
territory of a Contracting State;
(b) the return of cultural objects removed from the territory of a
Contracting State contrary to its law regulating the export of
cultural objects because of their cultural significance.
Id. (emphasis added).
12 Note that this was a point discussed-and subsequently decided-at
the first negotiating session held in Rome on May 6-10, 1991. See Report
on UNIDROIT First Session, supra note 119, at 2. See also UNIDROIT
Study LXX - Doc. 48, Committee of Governmental Experts on the
International Protection of Cultural Property, Report on the Fourth Session
5 (Sept. 29 - Oct. 8, 1993) [hereinafter Report on UNIDROIT Fourth
Session] (on file with author) ("Pursuant to the decision taken at the second
session of the committee of experts, the text of Article 1 of the preliminary
draft provides that the Convention covers only international situations.").
1. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, art. 2.
123 kd
"" See id. art. 9(1) (noting that a "claimant may in all cases bring'a
claim or request under this Convention before the courts or competent
authorities of the Contracting State where the cultural object is located").
1 See Report on UNIDROIT First Session, supra note 119, at 10-11.
The discretion left to the adjudicatory body has been described as follows:
[W]hen drafting the present text the study group had been
conscious of the fact that unlike the 1970 [UNESCO] Convention,
the provisions of which were mainly of a public law character
addressed to States, the instrument under preparation in Unidroit
[sic] was one which would be applied and interpreted essentially by
judges and that its scope of application should therefore be
determined in as clear and simple a manner as possible.
Id. See also Crewdson, supra note 31, at 47 ("[W]hat is and what is not a
cultural object will be a matter of judicial decision.").
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it has been ratified and implemented, the Convention will be
applied only prospectively."' 1
4.2. Stolen Cultural Objects
Chapter II of the draft UNIDROIT Convention covers the
restitution of stolen cultural artifacts." 2 Article 3(2), one of
several significant and innovative provisions, provides that
illegally excavated items.33 or those that are excavated
legally but are illegally retained'3 (e.g., by the excavator
rather than by the rightful owner, which in many instances
will be the State) "shall be deemed to have been stolen."' 5
Like all other stolen cultural objects, these must be
returned."3 6
It is important to note that for civil law countries that
ratify the Convention, this aspect of Chapter II is
revolutionary, as it "reverses the general civil law presumption
prevalent in continental Europe that a bona fide purchaser of
a stolen cultural object acquires good title."' 7 In this
regard, the UNIDROIT Convention also requires possessors to
exercise due diligence when acquiring objects in order to
qualify for reasonable compensation upon the return of stolen
objects.' With respect to the level of compensation
.1 See 1994 Burman Memorandum, supra note 118, at 3 (noting the
general rule that treaties "can only be applied prospectively unless states
agree otherwise" and that the "U.S. made it clear that we would regardless
apply a strict non-retroactivity rule through implementing legislation").
" UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, arts. 3-4 (Chapter II is
entitled Restitution of Stolen Cultural Objects).1 s I& art. 3(2).
134 Id
13 I& art. 3(1) ("The possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen
shall return it."). But see 1994 Burman Memorandum, supra note 118, at
3 (stating that "equating illegal excavation with theft in the first part of the
convention covering 'stolen' property raises legal problems that need to be
dealt with").
137 Crewdson, supra note 31, at 46.
13 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, art. 4(1). But see Report on
UNIDROIT Fourth Session, supra note 126, at 21 (noting that"[tihe number
of cases in which compensation would have to be paid would.., be limited
... [because] [iln practice there would be very few possessors who would be
able to prove that they had satisfied all the requirements of due diligence
when acquiring a stolen object"). In the event that a claimant is unable to
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required, the "[a]bsence of a treaty standard will leave that for
courts or authorities in the country where the claim is filed to
resolve."'9
This requirement of due diligence, though not described in
detail in the draft UNIDROIT Convention, 40 undoubtedly
will impede the market in stolen works of art. Once this
provision of the Convention goes into effect, well-informed
individuals and institutions will no longer acquire works
hastily and secretly due to the potential future liability in the
event of a title dispute.' 4' Museums and other institutional
purchasers likely will be held to a higher standard of care than
individuals with fewer resources available to them.' 42
Article 4(3) also is important since it will be an effective
means of preventing the "laundering" of stolen cultural objects
through gifts or bequests to otherwise innocent parties. 43
It provides that a "possessor shall not be in a more favourable
position than the person from whom it acquired the object by
inheritance or otherwise gratuitously."144  This focus on
acquisition by gift or bequest will have special significance for
pay "reasonable compensation" for an object that has been stolen or illegally
exported from it, it may very well be possible for a third party to provide the
funds necessary for such payment. UNIDROIT Study LXX - Doe. 39,
Committee of Governmental Experts on the International Protection of
Cultural Property, Report on the Third Session 22 (Feb. 22-26, 1993) (on file
with author) (noting "a consensus that the Convention did not require the
owner itself to pay compensation, and that in no way was [the language of
Article 4(1)] ... intended to exclude a system of sponsorship or any other
method of paying the compensation").
... 1994 Burman Memorandum, supra note 118, at 3. It is worth noting
that compensation may vary greatly depending on the standard used. See
id. ("Compensation can range from full market value in a developed country,
to acquisition cost, to 'value' determined in the country of origin which could
have high social or ethnological value, but much lower market value,
especially if the market in that country is restricted.").
1' UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, art. 4(2).
1" See Report on UNIDROIT Fourth Session, supra note 126, at 21
(stating that "the raison d'etre of Article 4 was to penalise those who
acquired cultural objects without making serious enquiries into their
provenance").
" Article 4 indicates that "regard shall be had to the circumstances of
the acquisition, including the character of the parties and the price
paid...." Ia art. 4(2).
143 Id. art. 4(3).
'" Id. This language appears in the same form in Article 8(5) with
respect to illegally exported cultural objects. Id. art. 8(5).
1994]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
museums and other charitable organizations that receive
numerous gifts and bequests of works of art, for they will be
in the same position as the original possessor with regard to
the application of Articles 3 and 4. They therefore will need
to exercise particular care in determining the provenance of
gifts and bequests as well as purchases of works of art.
Essentially, this
"imputed knowledge" rule charges a gratuitous
possessor ... with the knowledge of its donor. The
practical import would be to deny compensation to a
museum or purchaser required to return an object, even
if it could show that it exercised reasonable diligence,
if the donor is shown to have had knowledge of
illegality of the transfer."5
4.3. Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
Chapter III of the draft UNIDROIT Convention, which
covers the return of illegally exported cultural objects,'
contains perhaps the most controversial of the Convention's
provisions."' A direct reaction to the evisceration of the
original version of Article 7 of the UNESCO Convention
regarding illegally exported cultural property,'" the current
draft UNIDROIT Convention explicitly provides for the return
of such objects under conditions set forth in Article 5.4
Even when those conditions have been met, however, a court
may refuse to return a cultural object if it determines that
that object "has a closer connection with the culture of the
State addressed,"'50  or if the object was previously
"unlawfully removed from the State addressed."' In
addition, the possessor may be entitled to compensation for the
"51994 Burman Memorandum, supra note 118, at 3.
148 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, arts. 5-8 (Chapter III, entitled
Return of Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, is comprised of Articles 5
through 8).
"4' See Crewdson, supra note 31, at 47 ("Chapter III which deals with the
return of illegally exported cultural objects ran into problems from the start
of the [drafting] ... sessions.").
148 See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
148 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 31, art. 5.
0 I& art. 6(1)(a).
"5 Id& art. 6(1)(b).
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return of an illegally exported object if it meets the
requirements of Article 8 at the time of the acquisition."'
Inclusion of Article 5 or similar language in the final draft of
the UNIDROIT Convention undoubtedly will create
impediments to its ratification and implementation in the
United States,"' which was instrumental in changing the
language of the original Article 7 in the UNESCO
Convention.'"
5. CONCLUSION
Whether or not the draft UNIDROIT Convention is ratified,
the illicit international trade in art undoubtedly will continue.
The provisions of the current draft, if enacted in a majority of
states, will do a great deal to hinder this trade, but there
simply is too much money at stake for thieves and smugglers
(as well as art dealers and auction houses) and too little money
available for enforcement to eradicate the illicit international
trade in art completely. Thus, "so long as there is a world
market for beautiful archaeological objects, a substantial
amount of looting will persist no matter what regulatory
system is installed, because total prevention would entail
unacceptable costs."155 Such strong and highly remunerative
market forces... seem almost certain to prevail over even the
most well-drafted statutes and treaties. Nonetheless, the draft
UNIDROIT Convention is a step in the right direction, as it
promises to remedy many of the weaknesses of the UNESCO
1.. See id. art. 8(1) (noting that the possessor must have been without
actual or constructive knowledge at the time of acquisition in order to
qualify for compensation).
153 It is likely that other art-market nations, none of which ratified the
UNESCO Convention, would also refuse to ratify the UNIDROIT Convention
with such a provision in the text.
'"See supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
'"BATOR, supra note 20, at 49.
15 The importance of the market should not be underestimated in this
area. Plundering and looting do not occur simply because people around the
world appreciate objects of beauty. They occur because there is a vast
supply of such works of art, a continuous demand, and tremendous profits
to be made in such transactions. See UNESCO COMPENDIUM, supra note 29,
at 21. ("[T]he problem of the illicit circulation of cultural property is
essentially a consequence of the existence of a market based upon the law
of supply and demand. It is practically impossible to prevent all frauds and
illicit exports.").
1994]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
500 U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L. [Vol. 15:3
Convention. The draft UNIDROIT Convention provides a
glimmer of hope for increased regulation of a market that has
become a virtual free-for-all. In the ongoing battle against the
illicit international trade in cultural property, each small
success counts toward the final goal of preserving the world's
cultural property and respecting rights of ownership.
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APPENDIX
DRAFT UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL RETURN OF STOLEN
OR ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS
as resulted from the fourth session of the Unidroit
committee of governmental experts on the international
protection of cultural property
(Rome, 29 September - 8 October 1993)
CHAPTER I - SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND
DEFINITION
ARTICLE 1
This Convention applies to claims of an international
character for
(a) the restitution of stolen cultural objects removed from
the territory of a Contracting State;
(b) the return of cultural objects removed from the
territory of a Contracting State contrary to its law
regulating the export of cultural objects because of their
cultural significance.
ARTICLE 2
For the purposes of this Convention, cultural objects are
those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of
importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature,
art or science such as those objects belonging to the
categories listed in Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
Property.
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CHAPTER II - RESTITUTION OF STOLEN CULTURAL
OBJECTS
ARTICLE 3
(1) The possessor of a cultural object which has been
stolen shall return it.
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, an object which
has been unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated and
unlawfully retained shall be deemed to have been stolen.
(3) Any claim for restitution shall be brought within a
period of [one] [three] year[s] from the time when the
claimant knew or ought reasonably to have known the
location of the object and the identity of its possessor, and in
any case within a period of [thirty] [fifty] years from the
time of the theft.
(4) However, a claim for restitution of an object
belonging to a public collection of a Contracting State [shall
not be subject to prescription] [shall be brought within a
time limit of [75] years].
[ For the purposes of this paragraph, a "public collection"
consists of a collection of inventoried cultural objects, which
is accessible to the public on a [substantial and] regular
basis, and is the property of
(i) a Contracting State [or local or regional
authority],
(ii) an institution substantially financed by a
Contracting State [or local or regional
authority],
(iii) a non profit institution which is recognised by
a Contracting State [or local or regional
authority] (for example by way of tax
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(iv) a religious institution.]
ARTICLE 4
(1) The possessor of a stolen cultural object who is
required to return it shall be entitled at the time of
restitution to payment by the claimant of fair and
reasonable compensation provided that the possessor neither
knew nor ought reasonably to have known that the object
was stolen and can prove that it exercised due diligence
when acquiring the object.
(2) In determining whether the possessor exercised due
diligence, regard shall be had to the circumstances of the
acquisition, including the character of the parties, the price
paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably
accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any other
relevant information and documentation which it could
reasonably have obtained.
(3) The possessor shall not be in a more favourable
position than the person from whom it acquired the object
by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously.
CHAPTER III - RETURN OF ILLEGALLY EXPORTED
CULTURAL OBJECTS
ARTICLE 5
(1) A Contracting State may request the court or other
competent authority of another Contracting State acting
under Article 9 to order the return of a cultural object which
has
(a) been removed from the territory of the
requesting State contrary to its law regulating the export of
cultural objects because of their cultural significance;
(b) been temporarily exported from the territory of
the requesting State under a permit, for purposes such as
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exhibition, research or restoration, and not returned in
accordance with the terms of that permit [, or
(c) been taken from a site contrary to the laws of
the requesting State applicable to the excavation of cultural
objects and removed from that State ].
(2) The court or other competent authority of the State
addressed shall order the return of the object if the
requesting State establishes that the removal of the object
from its territory significantly impairs one or more of the
following interests
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its
context,
(b) the integrity of a complex object,
(c) the preservation of information of, for example,
a scientific or historical character,
(d) the use of the object by a living culture,or
establishes that the object is of outstanding
cultural importance for the requesting State.
(3) Any request made under paragraph 1 shall contain or
be accompanied by such information of a factual or legal
nature as may assist the court or other competent authority
of the State addressed in determining whether the
requirements of paragraphs 1 and 2 have been met.
(4) Any request for return shall be brought within a
period of [one] [three] year[s] from the time when the
requesting State knew or ought reasonably to have known
the location of the object and the identity of its possessor,
and in any case within a period of [thirty] [fifty] years from
the date of the export.
ARTICLE 6
(1) When the requirements of Article 5, paragraph 2
have been satisfied, the court or other competent authority
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of the State addressed may only refuse to order the return of
a cultural object where
(a) the object has a closer connection with the
culture of the State addressed [, or
(b) the object, prior to its unlawful removal from
the territory of the requesting State, was
unlawfully removed from the State addressed].
(2) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of the preceding
paragraph shall not apply in the case of objects referred to
in Article 5, paragraph 1(b).
ARTICLE 7
(1) The provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1 shall not
apply where the export of the cultural object is no longer
illegal at the time at which the return is requested.
(2) Neither shall they apply where
(a) the object was exported during the lifetime of
the person who created it [or within a period of
[five] years following the death of that person];
or
(b) the creator is not known, if the object was less
than [twenty] years old at the time of export [;
except where the object was made by a
member of an indigenous community for use by
that community ].
ARTICLE 8
(1) The possessor of a cultural object removed from the
territory of a Contracting State contrary to its law
regulating the export of cultural objects because of their
cultural significance shall be entitled, at the time of the
return of the object, to payment by the requesting State of
fair and reasonable compensation, provided that the
1994]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
possessor neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known
at the time of acquisition that the object had been
unlawfully removed.
[ (2) Where a Contracting State has instituted a system
of export certificates, the absence of an export certificate for
an object for which it is required shall put the purchaser on
notice that the object has been illegally exported. ]
(3) Instead of requiring compensation, and in agreement
with the requesting State, the possessor may, when
returning the object to that State, decide
(a) to retain ownership of the object; or
(b) to transfer ownership against payment or
gratuitously to a person of its choice residing
in the requesting State and who provides the
necessary guarantees.
(4) The cost of returning the object in accordance with
this article shall be borne by the requesting State, without
prejudice to the right of that State to recover costs from any
other person.
(5) The possessor shall not be in a more favourable
position than the person from whom it acquired the object
by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously.
CHAPTER IV - CLAIMS AND ACTIONS
ARTICLE 9
(1) Without prejudice to the rules concerning jurisdiction
in force in Contracting States, the claimant may in all cases
bring a claim or request under this Convention before the
courts or other competent authorities of the Contracting
State where the cultural object is located.
(2) The parties may also agree to submit the dispute to
another jurisdiction or to arbitration.
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(3) Resort may be had to the provisional, including
protective, measures available under the law of the
Contracting State where the object is located even when the
claim for restitution or request for return of the object is
brought before the courts or other competent authorities of
another Contracting State.
CHAPTER V - FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 10
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting
State from applying any rules more favourable to the
restitution or the return of a stolen or illegally exported
cultural object than provided for by this Convention.
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